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Abstract
This essay focuses on the impact of recent changes in corporate governance on ethical
behavior within the public corporation. It argues that a style of corporate behavior—one
characterized by a risk tolerant, even reckless, pursuit of short-term profits and a disregard for
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies—is attributable in significant part to recent
changes in corporate governance, including the rise of hedge fund activism, greater use of
incentive compensation, and the appearance of blockholder directors. It then surveys feasible
responses intended to strengthen the role of the boards as the corporation’s conscience and
superego. Given the difficulty of reform, it predicts that the problems identified are likely to
get worse before they get better.
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Preserving the Corporate Superego in a Time of Activism: An Essay on Ethics and Economics

By John C. Coffee, Jr.
I.

Introduction

Corporate governance matters—and in more ways than are immediately obvious. Most
commentators stress that governance matters to corporate efficiency and the unending pursuit of reduced
agency costs.1 This article will instead focus on the impact of governance on ethical behavior and
corporate social responsibility. From either perspective, when any important element in the corporate
governance environment is disturbed, the impact of this disturbance radiates broadly, causing unexpected
and unintended changes in corporate behavior. In particular, this article will contend that a particular
style of corporate behavior—characterized by a risk tolerant, even reckless, pursuit of short-term profits
and a disregard for the interests of non-shareholder constituencies—is a reaction attributable to a new
influence acting on the corporate governance environment: namely, pressure from shareholder activists
(mainly hedge funds) that are rationally risk tolerant and that focus on short-term share value
maximization. The consequence is a shift towards heightened leverage, the acceptance of greater risk,
and shortened time horizons. That frames this article’s ultimate issue: What, if anything, can or should be
done in response to this development?
Immediately, it is important not to overstate. No claim is here made that an epidemic of
corporate irresponsibility is underway, that hedge funds are inherently amoral, or that all activists



Professor Coffee is the Adolf A Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School and Director of its
Center on Corporate Governance. Professor Coffee would like to acknowledge the diligent research assistance on
this article provided by Amir Vitale, Columbia Law School LL.M., Class of 2017.
1
Some commentators argue that corporate governance matters most to the new activists, who in their view are
seeking to unite dispersed shareholders and serve as their natural champion. See Ronald J Gilson and Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights,
113 Colum. L. Rev. 863 (2013). In contrast, this article does not view the minimization of agency costs as the
ultimate goal of corporate law, but as one that may often be in tension with ethical behavior.
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consider only the short-run. Most public companies do behave responsibly (at least most of the time).
Nor is it denied that boards should seek to maximize shareholder value over the long-run, even if that
implies losses for other stakeholders. Rather, what is contended is that activist pressure tends to curb the
board’s discretion to (1) plan for the long term; (2) disdain questionable or unethical behavior; and (3)
accommodate the legitimate interests of other stakeholders.
In particular, as activist pressure increases, the role of the board as the corporation’s superego is
gradually marginalized and possibly eclipsed. This term “superego” may seem out of place here, more
appropriate to a discussion of Freudian psychology than corporate law and economics. But this article is
premised on the belief that the board of the public corporation has traditionally played such a role as the
corporate organ most likely to exercise restraint, to recognize ethical limits on profit maximization, and to
accommodate other stakeholders. At least until recently, boards at public companies approached
decision-making with a distinctive style that was deliberative, collegial, consensus-seeking and at least
slightly risk-averse. If a proposed policy or course of action carried legal or reputational risk or would
prejudice the interests of other stakeholders, this was a reason for many boards to disfavor it, or at least to
exercise caution.2 Yet, this risk-averse bias was probably grounded on a particular set of relationships
among the board, management, and the corporation’s shareholders, which relationships have now
changed. As a result, not only will more risk be tolerated, but also the very idea of the board as a
cohesive, collegial body may be yielding to a different conception of the board as a collection of proxies
for specific groups of shareholders. Fragmented and factionalized, such a board would represent a
weaker superego (if it still played that role at all).
Discussions of corporate ethics and social responsibility often tend to be more aspirational and
exhortative than diagnostic. In contrast, this article seeks to provide an economic foundation for both its
critique and its prescriptions. Ultimately, it will offer both a rationale and specific reforms to enhance the
2

Although the risk of personal liability for a director is remote, this factor probably also contributed to their
preference to avoid illegal or questionable acts, particularly in light of the relatively modest economic benefits
historically paid to outside directors.
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role of the board as the corporation’s superego. First, however, we need to examine more closely the new
risk-tolerant style of corporate behavior that this article asserts results from changes in the corporate
governance environment. As its poster child for “poor” corporate governance, this article will focus in
Part I on Valeant Pharmaceuticals International. Then, in Part II, it will attribute its deficiencies and
reckless style to three basic transitions in corporate governance: (1) the rise of undiversified institutional
investors (chiefly, hedge funds) as the new catalyst of shareholder activism; (2) the appearance of
“blockholder” directors as the agents of specific shareholders; and (3) the shift from cash to equity
compensation for both officers and directors. Collectively, these transitions are moving us from a system
of corporate governance that was board-centric to one that is shareholder-centric. To be sure, other
factors—the decline in staggered boards; 3 the growing importance of proxy advisors; 4 the availability of
“proxy access,”5 and SEC deregulation6—also explain much of the increase in shareholder activism and
have contributed to the shift to a shareholder-centric system. But these developments are themselves the
product of shareholder demands for movement toward a more shareholder-centric system of governance.
That heightened demand caused institutional holders to resist staggered boards, seek proxy access, and
hire proxy advisors as their agents. Part III will offer a short history of corporate governance that uses

3

In 2000, 300 of the S&P 500 had staggered boards, but as of the end of 2013, only 60 did. See Stephen Davidoff
Solomon, “The Case Against Staggered Boards,” N.Y. Times Blogs, Dealbook (March 20, 2012); David Benoit,
“Clash over Darden Board Will be Measure of Activist Clout,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2014.
4
See, for example, Peter Iliev and Michelle Lowry, “Are Mutual Funds Active Voters” (finding over 25% of mutual
funds “to rely almost entirely on ISS recommendations”)(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2145398)(2014).
Many mutual funds may make independent decisions, but the strong influence of Institutional Shareholder Services
(“ISS”), the principal proxy adviser, seems demonstrated by such data.
5
Proxy access refers to procedures, adopted usually in response to pressure from activists, pursuant which the
corporation permits a defined percentage of shareholders (usually between three to five percent) who have held their
shares for a requisite period (usually three years) to place between one and three candidates on the corporation’s
own proxy statement, thus enabling shareholders to choose among these candidates and the corporation’s own slate
of nominees. Although proxy access does not enable insurgents to seize control, it does both facilitate shareholder
choice and spare the insurgents the cost of mounting a proxy fight to obtain board representation. However, because
hedge funds have rarely held their shares for three years at the time they seek proxy access, they are thus required to
find allies among longer holding diversified investors in order to exploit this provision. Much debate has surrounded
the likely impact of this reform, but it is clearly being widely adopted. EY reports that over the last two years more
than a third of Standard & Poor’s 500 companies have adopted a “proxy access” proposal, driven largely by
shareholder proposals. See EY, “Four takeaways from proxy season 2016,” at 1.
6
For a brief overview of SEC deregulation of the proxy process, see John C. Coffee and Darius Palia, The Wolf at
the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 Journal of Corporation Law 545, 559561 (2016).
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these transitions to segment modern corporate history into three periods. Finally, Part IV turns to how a
stronger corporate superego might be developed and protected.
II.

Risky Business: The Valeant Story

Few firms have achieved notoriety as quickly as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International.7
Valeant’s basic business model was to buy prescription drugs (or the companies owning those drugs) and
then raise the prices of those drugs astronomically—up to 600% or more.8 Figure A shows this basic
pattern:9

7

Valeant came to dominate the news in the latter half of 2015. For representative stories, see Andrew Pollack and
Sabrina Tavernise, “Valeant’s Drug Price Strategy Enriches It, but Infuriates Patients and Lawmakers,” New York
Times, Oct. 4, 2015; Joe Nocera, “Is Valeant Pharmaceuticals the Next Enron?,” New York Times, October 27,
2015; Jonathan Rockoff, “Valeant Pharmaceuticals Under Investigation by Federal Prosecutors,” The Wall Street
Journal, October 15, 2015.
8
To give two examples uncovered by the Committee on Oversight and Governmental Reform of the U.S. House of
Representatives:
“In February 2015, Valeant purchases Isuprel and Nitropress, which treat abnormal heart rhythms,
congestive heart failure, and hypertension episodes, for $350 million, and increased their prices by
525% and 212% overnight.” See Memorandum, dated February 2, 2016, to Democratic Members
of the Committee, Re: Documents Obtained by Committee from Valeant Pharmaceuticals” at p. 1
(hereinafter, “House Memorandum”)(copy on file with the author).
This House Memorandum went on to state:
“The documents indicate that Mr. Pearson (Valeant’s CEO) purchased Isuprel and Nitropress in
order to dramatically increase their prices and drive up his company’s revenues and profits…The
documents obtained by the Committee demonstrate that Valeant identified goals for revenues first,
and then set drug prices to reach those goals. Valeant employed this strategy for both Isuprel and
Nitropress, generating gross revenues of more than $547 million and profits of approximately
$315 million in 2015 alone.”
For even higher percentage price spikes, see infra at note 23.
9
See “A Drug Company’s Price Tactics Pinch Insurers and Consumers,” New York Times, October 5, 2015.
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When Valeant acquired the entire company, it typically slashed or eliminated the acquired company’s
own “research and development” budget and spiked prices on its existing product line.10 Since 2010,
Valeant acquired companies with a total value of over $36 billion.11 Even by this measure then, its “slash
and burn” style was reshaping the drug industry. Symptomatically, Valeant was emulating the behavior
of activist hedge funds, which characteristically seek in their “engagements” with public firms to reduce
the target firm’s investment in longer-term projects in favor of maximizing shareholder payout.12
Is there anything wrong or unethical about this behavior? If all Valeant did was to raise prices to
extraordinary levels to benefit shareholders, some (and most notably, Milton Friedman) would argue that

10

See Pollack and Tavernise, supra note 7 (“Valeant is known for buying companies and laying off employees to
achieve savings, while accumulating a debt of about $30 billion”). These authors further note that Valeant “spends
an amount equivalent to only 3 percent of its sales on research and development, which it views as risky and
inefficient compared with buying existing drugs” while “traditional big drug companies spend 15 to 20 of sales on
research on development.”)
11
See Gretchen Morgenson, “Valeant’s High-Price Drug Strategy” New York Times, October 2, 2015.
12
A major aim of hedge fund activism has recently been to reduce investment by target companies in long-term
investments and particularly in “research and development” investments. See Coffee and Palia, supra note 6, at 573
to 581.
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managers were under a duty to do so to maximize profits.13 At first glance, it may seem that Valeant was
such a case in which Valeant was simply maximizing shareholder value by squeezing the last penny out
of patients and insurers. Yet, why had not the original owner of the drug done the same? On closer
examination, Valeant’s success owed much to deceptive behavior, particularly involving its undisclosed
relationship with a captive online pharmacy company, Philidor Services, which Valeant held an option to
buy.14 Because Philidor would order Valeant’s drugs at an inflated price and bill the insurer, the patient
may never have learned of the price spike, and the insurer did not know that Philidor was only a sock
puppet for Valeant. Thus, the insurer did not demand that a cheaper generic drug be substituted for
Valeant’s higher priced brand name drug. As a New York Times columnist concluded, Valeant used
Philidor “to keep patients from getting generics instead of its high-priced drugs.”15 Although Philidor’s
seeming independence corroborated Valeant’s pricing, it was entirely illusory, as Valeant actually
consolidated Philidor’s financial results with its own. The relationship between the two firms has
spawned a grand jury investigation, and when that investigation was disclosed publicly in late 2015,
Valeant’s stock price tanked and insurers refused to deal with Philidor.16
The point here is that Valeant’s hard-nosed, profit-maximizing behavior seems to have involved
an element of fraud. Valeant did not simply negotiate a hard bargain with its customers and other
stakeholders, but seems to have actually deceived them. When this deception was disclosed, Valeant was
disgraced, and its stock price immediately fell by over two-thirds.

13

Milton Friedman, of course, famously argued that the “social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”
See Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,” The New York Times
Magazine, September 13, 1970. Many economists would agree with him, but the law’s view is more qualified. See
text and note infra at note 79. Note also that Mr. Friedman focused on profits and not maximizing the stock price,
which goal raises other issues.
14
See Linette Lopez, “The secret firm at the heart of Valeant’s crisis has an alleged history of shady behavior with
customers,” Business Insider, October 23, 2015; Robert Langreth and Esme Deprez,” The Tiny Pharmacy at the
Center of Valeant’s Money Mystery,” Bloomberg, October 29, 2015.
15
See Nocera, supra note 7. This author opens his New York Times column by observing: “Valeant Pharmaceuticals
is a sleazy company.” Id. That has been the standard reaction.
16
See Rockoff, supra note 7; see also Myles Lidland, “Pharma-Giant Valeant accused of fraud, denies it—stock still
craters,” Business Insider, October 21, 2015. This criminal investigation has recently heated up in 2016. See Jacquie
McNish and Christopher N. Matthews, “Valeant Faces Criminal Probe.” Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2016 at B1.
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Now comes the two points that make Valeant’s story particularly relevant: First, Valeant was the
darling of the hedge funds, and was heavily owned and influenced by them.17 The press has described
Valeant as a “hedge fund hotel,”18 because a number of prominent hedge funds held large stakes in it or
even took seats on its board. This herding should not surprise us. Much like the typical “activist” fund,
Valeant shunned long-term investment projects in favor of short-term returns. Nor did Valeant see any
reason to accommodate the stakeholders who relied on it.
Arguably, one could defend Valeant’s conduct on the ground that it was simply seeking to
maximize shareholder value and thus gave no quarter to other stakeholders. But here we encounter again
the basic dilemma to which this article will return: those firms that most aggressively pursue shareholder
wealth maximization often utilize questionable to illegal means. Eventually, as its problems mounted,
Valeant was compelled to replace its CEO and change its business model.
Second, at least equally causal of the Valeant fiasco, was its aggressive use of incentive
compensation. J. Michael Pearson, Valeant’s CEO, received a compensation package, designed largely
by ValueAct, a hedge fund and major Valeant shareholder, that paid Pearson only $1 million in cash, but
also offered him an assortment of contingent equity awards (stock and options) valued at $16 million.19
In particular, Pearson received performance stock units that would vest only if Valeant achieved the
following three-year compounded total shareholder returns:
17

See Julia La Roche, “It’s a hedge fund horror show as Valeant gets crushed,” Business Insider, October 21, 2015.
As of June, 30, 2015, the following leading activist funds held the following percentages in Valeant’s stock:
Pershing Square……….. 5.71%
Value Act Holdings…… 4.39%
Paulsen and Co………... 2.64%
Lone Pine Capital……... 1.56%
Viking Global…………. 1.35%
The total is 15.56% and other activist funds have not disclosed their holdings in Valeant. See La Roche, supra note
17. As of October, 2015, Pershing Square, perhaps the most visible activist fund in the U.S., had lost over $1 billion.
ValueAct, another prominent hedge fund, was reported to have lost over $2 billion (as it had held over 5.6% as of
mid-2015). See Maureen Farrell and David Benoit, “It’s Crunch Time for the Hedge Fund that Helped Build
Valeant,” The Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2015. For the view that Valeant was a “hedge fund hotel,” see VRX,
“Valeant Proves to Be A Hedge Fund Hotel Wrecking Ball,” VALUEWALK, May 17, 2016 (noting as of this later
date that the stock was now down 90% since its price peaked in 2015 and that a long list of funds had finally sold
out their positions).
19
See David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, “CEO Pay at Valeant: Does Extreme Compensation Create Extreme
Risk?” Stanford Closer Look Series, CGRP56 (April 28, 2016) at p.1.
18
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1) 3-year Total Shareholder Return (“TSR”) ˂ 15%...0
2) 3-year TSR from 15 to 29%, 407,498 shares vested
3) 3-year TSR return of 30 to 44%, 814,996 shares vested.
4) 3-year TSR ˃ 45 %, 1,222,494 shares vested20
Other senior officers received similar awards. Based on this reward structure, Pearson moved quickly to
slash overhead, shrink the research and development budget, and move Valeant to Canada (and a reduced
corporate tax rate). Although his tactics worked at first, he brought the company under increasing public
and regulatory scrutiny, and scrutiny discovered legal and reputational issues. Eventually, the board was
forced to conduct an extended review of the company’s financial statements and delay their release.
Ratings agencies downgraded their ratings on Valeant, and under pressure, Pearson resigned.
All this seems fully consistent with the most basic generalization about executive compensation:
executives respond to equity awards (and particularly stock options) by taking increased risk.21 Such
incentive also may incline executives to engage in financial misreporting.22 At Valeant, extreme
incentives produced extreme behavior.
We will later return to these two factors: hedge fund pressure and incentive compensation. In
truth, they go together, and Valeant is not a case where shareholder pressure alone pushed the company
into illegality. Rather, its managers and its shareholders seem both to have been zealously committed to
maximize shareholder value in the short-run, for their own reasons. That made Valeant an ideal candidate
for hedge fund portfolios, and the funds herded to buy Valeant. But when, as here, managerial and
shareholder incentives to take risk reinforce each other this aggressively, danger looms.

20

Id.
See, e.g., Jeff L. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel and Lalitha Naveen, Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking, 79(2)
Journal of Financial Economics 413-468 (2006); David F. Larcker, Gaika Ormazabal, Brian Taylor, and Donald J.
Taylor, “Follow the Money: Compensation, Risk and the Financial Crisis,” Stanford Closer Look Series (September
8, 2014).
22
Cristopher S. Armstrong, David F. Larcker, Gaika Ormazabal, and Daniel J. Taylor, The Relation Between Equity
Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives, 109(2) Journal of Financial Economics 327-350
(2013).
21
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Of course, Valeant is only one example, but it became the role model for the rest of the industry,
which, after initially criticizing Valeant, started to adopt its approach.23 In the wake of Valeant’s success
and pressure from activists, the pharmaceutical industry at least marginally curbed its traditional emphasis
on research and development to move towards Valeant’s contrarian business model that disfavored longterm investments. The most recent and much publicized example of such a transition is Mylan, N.V., a
major generic drug company. In 2016, Mylan attracted a firestorm of adverse publicity for its decision to
spike the price of EpiPen, an emergency treatment for persons with life-threatening allergies.24 Why did
it announce a price spike at a time when this was certain to attract criticism? One only has to connect the
dots. In 2014, the Mylan board approved a one-time stock award “that hinged on more than doubling the
company’s adjusted per-share earnings over a five-year period ending in 2018.”25 Because Mylan was in
the mature and low-growth generic drug business, this seemed an unattainable goal. Still, for the
company’s top five executives, the award was “potentially worth $82 million overall.”26 So incentivized,
managers spiked the price of EpiPen, their leading product, in 2016 and tolerated the criticism.
This pattern of incentive compensation producing a tolerance (or even zest) for unethical
behavior is not in any way limited to the pharmaceutical industry. The clearest example of rampantly

23

Although Valeant invented the business model of buying drugs and drug companies to mark up prices, the most
aggressive practitioner of this model has been Turing Pharmaceuticals, which marked up the price of Dataprim from
$13.50 per tablet to $750 per tablet. Dataprim was described by the New York Times as “the standard of care for
treating a life-threatening parasitic infection.” See Andrew Pollack, “Drug goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750
Overnight,” New York Times, September 20, 2015. Martin Shkreli, the founder and CEO of Turing, was formerly a
hedge fund manager, and has since been indicted on a variety of charges, partly involving his allegedly fraudulent
treatment of his own hedge fund investors. Testifying before Congress, the flamboyant Shkreli defended his
conduct, saying that all drug companies were now following Valeant’s model. Subsequent articles have agreed that
he was largely correct. See Robert Longreth and Rebecca Spalding, “Shkreli was Right: Everyone’s Hiking Drug
Prices,” Bloomberg, February 2, 2016. (reporting that a survey of 5,000 brand-name prescription drugs found that
the price more than doubled for 60 and at least quadrupled for 20 since 2014). The percentage record was set by
Alcortin A, a combination antibiotic and steroid, which soared 1,860 percent over that period. For similar accounts
of industry-wide price increases, see “Pharmaceutical Companies Buy Rivals’ Drugs, Then Jack-Up The Prices,”
Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2015; Carolyn Y. Jo
hnson, “As therapies for rare diseases enrich drugmakers, do they pain everyone else?” Washington Post, August 5,
2016 (noting impact of Orphan Drug Act on prices on drugs for rare diseases).
24
Mylan increased the price of EpiPen from under $100 to $600, and this elicited a barrage of criticism, including a
very hostile New York Times editorial. See “Another Drug Ripoff,” N.Y Times, August 25, 2016 at A-18
(editorial).
25
See Mark Maremont, “Mylan Tied Pay to Tough Targets,” The Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2010 at B-1.
26
Id.
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fraudulent behavior induced by compensation incentives is supplied by Wells Fargo & Co., one of the
nation’s largest banks. At least 5,300 of its employees engaged in outright fraud over a five year period
in opening an estimated two million sham accounts for customers—without the customers’ knowledge or
authorization.27 The Wells Fargo executive with the seeming responsibility for monitoring Wells Fargo’s
aggressive cross-selling practices was Carrie Tolstedt, the divisional senior vice president for community
banking, who supervised the bank’s 6,000 retail branches. She announced her retirement just before the
scandal broke, taking with her an estimated $124 million “golden parachute.”28 Of course, one executive
cannot alone compel 5,300 employees to engage in rampant fraud, and her involvement in the actual fraud
has not been established. Still, lower echelon employees apparently feared for their jobs if they did not
meet ambitious quotas for cross-selling Wells Fargo’s products. Hence, many cheated. But high
incentives to those near the top can create unrealistic goals that induce underlings to commit fraud.
This pattern seems destined to repeat itself.
III.

What Has Changed in Corporate Governance That Explains a Weakened Corporate Superego?
Many barriers to shareholder activism have recently been downsized or relaxed. For example,

staggered boards are today far less common than in the past; 29 proxy advisors (most notably, Institutional
Shareholder Services (“ISS”)) have reduced the costs of shareholder coordination; 30 broker votes have
been restricted,31 thereby increasing the voting power of those who do vote; companies are accepting
27

Wells Fargo charged customers at least $1.5 million in fees for these unwanted accounts and additional fees for an
estimated 500,000 unauthorized credit cards. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, “The Brazen Shame No One Noticed,” New
York Times, September 13, 2016 at p. B-1. In 2016, Wells Fargo agreed to pay $185 million for this misconduct to
various regulators. 5,300 is the estimated number of Wells Fargo employees terminated over a five year period for
involvement in this misbehavior.
28
See Matt Egan, “$124 million payday for Wells Fargo exec who led fake accounts unit,” The Buzz, September 13,
2016 (available at http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/12/investing/wells-fargo-fake-account-exec-payday/). This
package was a mixture of shares, options, and restricted stock, and only some of it reflects incentive compensation.
But her annual salary was only $1.7 million. By any standard, this is an enormous payment to an executive who was
not even near the top of the Wells Fargo hierarchy.
29
See Coffee and Palia, supra note 6, at 557.
30
Id at 557 to 559.
31
Id at 561 to 562. Essentially, by restricting the broker’s ability to vote on behalf of retail shareholders who gave
the broker no voting instructions, the changed rules reduced the votes from brokers on behalf of retail shareholders
(which tend to favor management) and increased the voting power of institutional shareholders.
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“proxy access” proposals that simplify the process of direct shareholder nomination of directors; 32 and
the SEC has deregulated, reducing the costs of a proxy fight.33 But these reduced costs would mean little,
unless there were shareholders strongly interested in exercising voting rights. Here, there has been an
even more important change, as next discussed.
A. The Rise of the Undiversified Institutional Activist
It is conventional wisdom that individual shareholders are “rationally apathetic” about voting
(chiefly, because their vote will have little impact on the outcome). To the extent they have any interest,
retail shareholders tend loyally to support management. In contrast, institutional investors are different.
They value voting more because a relatively small number of them could constitute a voting plurality
(particularly if individual shareholders do not vote). In short, the conventional wisdom says that
institutions care because they have clout.
All this is true enough, but it misses something very important. Most institutional investors—in
particular, mutual funds and pension funds—are diversified, for both legal and non-legal reasons.34 Many
are also “indexed,” meaning that they are seeking only to earn the benchmark market return for equity.35
In either case, they are likely to hold a large portfolio of stocks, with no more than a single digit
percentage of their portfolio invested in any one stock. Typically, these institutions are also thinly staffed
(either for competitive reasons or simply because an indexed investor does not need much staff to hold

32

See text and note supra at note 5.
See Coffee and Palia, supra note 6, at 559 to 561.
34
Mutual funds are regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940, which bars a mutual fund (with certain
exceptions) from advertising itself as “diversified” if it owns more than 10% of the stock of any company. See
Investment Company Act of 1990, §5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. §80a-5(b)(1). Pension funds are regulated by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (or “ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq., which mandates diversification. See
ERISA §404(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1104(c). Only hedge funds stand apart and are free from such an obligation. Hedge
funds are also permitted to sell short, while mutual funds are not.
35
“Index” funds invest in a broad market index and thus are “passive” in the sense that they do not attempt to “beat”
the market. They have two advantages that have made them increasingly popular: (1) they charge low fees, and (2)
they cannot underperform the market, whereas many “active” funds do underperform. Of course, if an index fund
employs a significant staff to focus on voting decisions, it will have higher costs and may be compelled to charge
higher fees than their competitors. That would be a poor business model, and so indexed funds are unlikely to invest
significantly in shareholder voting, but instead delegate the task to proxy advisors.
33
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the market).36 These factors affect their voting behavior. Although they do vote (in part because the
Department of Labor and the SEC insist that they do so37), they are seldom willing to invest much time or
resources on specific voting issues at individual companies. Even rarer is a diversified institutional
investor proposing specific changes at a specific company.
Diversified investors tend to be most interested in voting on issues of generic significance, which
affect multiple companies in their portfolio. For example, they may have a generic position to vote
against the poison pill or against deviations from a “one-share-one-vote” rule. Or they may favor “proxy
access” or “say or pay” proposals. In general, institutional investors tend only to favor broad goals (such
as independent boards or environmental policies on climate change), which apply to many firms and can
be formulated in general terms. These investors are less likely to be interested in firm-specific issues that
require an ad hoc analysis. For example, they would not initiate a shareholder proposal on the following
topics: Should XYZ Corporation sell or spinoff its plastic division? Should it terminate its CEO? Should
it elect directors opposed to further investments by XYZ in research and development? These are firmspecific issues, and even the largest institutional investors are unlikely to have a pre-existing position on
them or much knowledge about the specific company. If the institution holds several hundred companies
in its portfolio, researching and coming to an informed decision on all these issues would be logistically
burdensome (and the payoff would be small, even if the policy change benefitted the company).
Although the diversified institutional investor will sometimes vote in favor of a firm-specific
shareholder proposal raised by some other investor, it will virtually never initiate such a shareholder
proposal itself. When it does vote against management, it is likely because its proxy advisor had

36

Little staff is needed, but equally important these firms compete based on low fees (which requires that they be
thinly staffed). Professional analysts, most notably Morningstar, Inc., rate mutual funds on their ability to economize
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recommended such a vote. Put differently, mutual funds and pension funds tended to be passive owners,
except when they face a recurring issue on which they had a general policy. Further, their proxy advisor
probably knows that diversified institutions tended to have little interest in firm-specific proposals and
thus proxy advisors have less incentive to advance such proposals to them.
Now comes the transition. Even if diversified investors prefer to support only broad, generic
proposals, another class of investor has the opposite incentives. Hedge funds typically have smaller
portfolios, and they are under no legal obligation to diversify.38 Activist funds generally hold only a
modest number of stocks (and they make large bets on these). Investors in hedge funds understand that
they are accepting high risk in return for a hopefully high return. If a hedge fund holds a thin portfolio—
say, six to ten stocks—it has every reason to formulate firm-specific proposals about those companies.
Activist funds are an important (and fairly recent) subset of hedge funds. Originally, hedge funds
sold themselves to the market on the claim that, through better research and analysis, they could find
“high alpha” stocks. In short, they would be better stock pickers. In reality, some lived up to this
standard, but most did not. Other hedge funds marketed themselves as “quantitative” funds that sought to
exploit market anomalies through the use of complex algorithms. Again, some succeeded, and others
failed. Such funds generally also had limited interest in voting. Eventually, however, some hedge fund
managers recognized that attempting to outperform the efficient market over the long run was not a viable
strategy. Instead of seeking the best stocks (the “super-alphas”), they could much more easily identify
mediocre companies, particularly those with low market value to book value ratios—and attempt to force
a sale or break-up of these firms. Put simply, the goal was to realize “negative synergy” (i.e., the
difference between the value of the firm’s assets and its lower stock price). The key attraction of this
approach was that it was relatively simple to identify mediocre companies with a high break-up value.

38

Because a hedge fund is normally exempt from the Investment Company Act under specific statutory exemptions
(most notably §§3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act), such a fund is neither subject to that Act’s
requirement of diversification or its prohibition on incentive compensation to investment managers.
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Nor does this approach offend the efficient market hypothesis, because the hedge fund is not simply a
stock picker; rather, it is trying to impose a change on the target firm that alters its value.
Negative synergy had also motivated “bust-up” takeovers at the end of the 1980s, but these had
been largely stopped by the advent of the “poison pill” and changes in the Delaware case law on takeover
defensive tactics.39 Ironically, some contemporary activist hedge funds are run by persons who were
“bust-up” bidders back in the 1980s.40 This continuity shows that, while bust-up takeovers could be
stopped, activists did not abandon their goal, but changed their tactics and resurfaced as hedge funds
seeking to vote out the board and then break up the target. Essentially, these activists knew that, in
contrast to a takeover, a proxy fight could not be as easily blocked by target management. When did
“activist” hedge funds first seek to launch proxy fights aimed at breaking up a company? Although it is
always hard to identify the first of anything, such efforts became clearly visible by 2005.41 After that
point, proxy fights aimed at forcing management to sell or spin off assets began to escalate rapidly.42
Hence, by 2010, a company with a low Tobin’s Q or a conglomerate structure was a natural target
for activist hedge funds. Once the activist fund acquired 5% or more of the target’s stock and filed the
legally-mandated disclosure (known as a Schedule 13D) with the SEC, this filing elicited a positive and
statistically significant market reaction.43 That, in turn, gave the activist fund the ability to reward its
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In particular, the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Paramount Communications v. Time Incorporated, 571
A.2d 1140 (Del 1989) reshaped the Delaware law on defensive tactics and suggested that the target’s board could
“just say no.” See also Unitrin v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995)(further enabling the target
board to resist).
40
Nelson Peltz, the founder of Trian Fund, a major activist fund, was a leading “bust-up” bidder in the late 1980s,
as, of course, was Carl Icahn. See Jonathan Lang, “The Peltz Principle: How Nelson Peltz Gets Results,” Barron’s
(July 4, 2015) (describing his tactics and history).
41
For the best and fullest study of the appearance of hedge fund activists, see Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate
Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism, 32 J. Corp. L. 681, 685 (2007) (dating the appearance at around
2005). Others place the date a few years earlier, but this dispute need not be resolved here.
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Bebchuck, et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulation by Activist Investors: Disclosure and Policy, 39 J. Corp. L. 1, 9
(2013).
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abnormal return of four percent on a Schedule 13D filing, but more than seven percent on initial such filings. See
Ulf Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Jan Schnitzler, “What is Special About Hedge Fund Activism?: Evidence from 13-D
Filings, at 2, 25 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2506704) (2014); for another study finding a seven percent abnormal
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allies, because by tipping its intent to conduct a campaign, it could give its allies a virtually riskless profit
if they bought the target’s shares before the Schedule 13D was filed. In return, the activist fund might
expect loyalty from its allies in the ensuing proxy fight.
Activists do not need actually to break the target company up. It was enough to put the target
company “in play” and raise its expected takeover premium. In the case of a bust-up takeover, if the
takeover bidder were outbid by a rival, the unsuccessful first bidder could still profit handsomely.
Similarly, in the case of a proxy fight, the insurgent could expect a jump in the target’s stock price once it
filed a Schedule 13D disclosing its ownership of a 5% block or more. The near certainty of such an
abnormal gain on disclosure of its stake empowered the hedge fund contestant. Because under U.S. law
the hedge fund could under most circumstances lawfully tip other institutions of its plans and anticipate
that they would also profit once its stake was disclosed,44 it held a carrot by which it could assemble a
large block of allies, collectively holding a much larger share of the target’s stock than it could, itself,
afford to buy. This informal association—known as a “wolf pack” in the parlance—often acquires a
block that dwarfs the holdings of target management,45 and this tilted the outcome of the proxy fight in
favor of the insurgents, who began to win consistently (nearly 75% of the time in contested proxy
battles).46

return, see Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729
(2008).
44
Under Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983), a necessary precondition to insider trading liability is a fiduciary
breach. An insider to the company does breach his or her duty to the corporation when the insider trades on material,
nonpublic information. But a hedge fund is typically not an insider and owes no duty to the corporation in which it
invests. Thus, under most circumstances, the hedge fund would not breach any duty to the target company or its
shareholders by indicating in advance to other funds its intent to file a Schedule 13D or start a proxy fight.
45
See Coffee and Palia, supra note 6, at 567-568.
46
In 2014, “activists won a record 73% of battles for board seats in the U.S., up from 52% in 2012.” See David
Benoit and Kirsten Grant, “Activist Investors’ Secret Ally: Big Mutual Funds,” Wall Street Journal, August 10,
2015. This article finds that activists won one or more seats at a record 107 companies in 2014.
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Why did the target’s stock price jump on this disclosure? Various reasons can be offered, but the
simplest and most plausible is that the company now had a higher expected takeover premium.47 If there
once was a 10% chance of a takeover at a premium, the disclosure of the insurgent’s stake raised that
possibility significantly, and the market reacted. One careful study finds that further stock price gains
after the Schedule 13D’s filing depend on their being a follow-up transaction (either a takeover or a
significant divestiture).48 Although some argue that the insurgents can create value by improving
management or supplying new ideas and vision, the evidence to date is to the contrary. A further gain in
the target’s stock price after the initial Schedule 13D disclosure depends on there being a follow-up
transaction.
The development of the “wolf pack” tactic and its ability to enable the participants to engage in
informed trading based on material non-public information helps explain the hyperbolic rise in
“engagements” by activist hedge funds over the last decade. At the same time, it also shows the close
association between higher risk activities and activities of dubious morality (i.e., tipping material
nonpublic information). In fairness, some activist funds will not share non-public data with potential
allies, but the evidence is clear that many do.
Now, we approach the central issue: If activist hedge funds are replacing traditional pension
funds and mutual funds as the primary catalyst in corporate governance, why does this transition imply a
shift in the direction of greater risk tolerance? Why might it also imply a greater willingness to engage in
unlawful, dubious, or at least morally problematic means?
Here, we need to begin with an important contrast between diversified and undiversified investors
in how they compensate their agents. Hedge fund managers are so extraordinarily well compensated that
in some years the top five hedge fund managers have earned more than all S&P 500 firms’ CEOs
47

One careful study finds that the excess returns from hedge fund activism are most closely associated with an
activist strategy of forcing the target firm into a takeover. See Robin Greenwood and Michael Schor, Investor
Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. of Fin. Econ. 362 (2009).
48
See Marco Brecht, Julian Franks, Jeremy Grant & Hammes F. Wagner, The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An
International Study, (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2376271) (2015).
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combined.49 Hedge fund managers are typically compensated under a formula that awards them annually
a percentage of the assets under management (usually 1.5% to 2%) plus a percentage of the profit earned
(typically 20%, but sometimes even more). This is very unlike the compensation paid to pension and
mutual fund managers, which is legally restricted and is typically a fixed percentage of assets under
management.50 Only the hedge fund manager receives a large incentive bonus, and the result is to create
a very large incentive to accept risk. Put differently, hedge fund managers profit on the upside but do not
necessarily bear much downside risk. Thus, if I get 20% of the profits and 0% of the losses, I am
incentivized to accept risk.
To be sure, many hedge funds are run by wealthy managers who have invested most of their own
personal fortunes in the fund, and that provides substantial counterbalance. But that is not a universal
pattern. Even more significantly, hedge fund managers have indirect incentives. If they are successful,
money will flow into their funds, leading to higher future fees. Lim, Sensoy and Weisbach have
computed that these lower-visibility indirect incentives are at least 1.4 times as large as the direct
incentives from incentive fees and the managers’ personal stakes in the funds.51 When one combines
direct and indirect incentives, they conclude that the typical hedge funds manager’s wealth increases by
$0.39 for a $1 increase in investor wealth—a very powerful incentive, indeed.52
Of course, competition is intense among hedge funds, and those who do not succeed will be
forced to exit the business. But as Lim, Sensoy and Weisbach observe:
“The exit option will lead managers to increase the risk of the fund, even
if doing so comes at a cost to investors.”53
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See Jongha Lim, Berk Sensoy, and Michael Weissbach, Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers, 71 J. of Fin.
871 (2016) (estimate as of 2007).
50
Hedge funds are unregulated, but mutual fund fees are closely regulated and incentive compensation is largely
prohibited to mutual fund managers. See Section 205 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Investment Advisers
Act”). The SEC does permit a modest level of incentive compensation, known as a “fulcrum fee,” but it does not
approach the incentive compensation that is paid to unregulated hedge funds.
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See Lim, Sensoy and Weisbach, supra note 49, at 871.
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Id. at 906.
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Id.
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They predict that “accounting manipulation or fraud” will occur “more frequently” in the case of younger
funds, where the manager can exit with less loss if the manager is unsuccessful.54
The point here is not that hedge funds are evil, amoral or dangerous, but that in their
“engagements” with public corporations, they will be regularly pushing the firms they engage toward
higher leverage and riskier strategies. Because they are today the driving force behind shareholder
activism, this implies that activism is increasingly leading to greater risk.
B. The Changing Board: The Rise of “Blockholder” Directors
Classically, nominees for the board of directors of a public company are selected by an
independent nominating committee, whose decisions the shareholders usually ratify. The nominating
committee of such a company understands that it owes fiduciary duties to all the shareholders, not just to
some special subset of them. The style of the public company board was collegial, and consensus was
generally sought. That pattern may, however, be rapidly changing.
Although the law remains that directors owe duties to all the shareholders, the new development
is the appearance of the “blockholder director”—a director selected by insurgents and typically placed on
the board as part of a settlement that averts a proxy fight. Between 2004 and 2012, Gow, Shin, and
Srinivasan identify some 824 “activist” directors at public companies who were appointed to the board in
response to demands by activists.55 Of these, 167 were elected in actual proxy contests, and 646 were
appointed to the board as the result of a settlement without a contested shareholder vote.56 This steep
ratio shows that companies have learned that it is wiser to settle than to fight. Moreover, of this 824 total,
some 346 (or 42%) were “affiliated” in the sense of being a principal or an employee of the activist fund
making the demand, while 478 (or 58%) were unaffiliated.57 Thus, in the case of the 346 “affiliated”
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Ian D. Gow, Sa-Pyung Sean Shin, and Suraj Srinivasan, “Activist Directors: Determinants and Consequences,”
Harvard Business School, Working Paper 14-120 (June 20, 2014) at p.2.
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directors, such director is probably receiving the bulk of his or her annual compensation from the hedge
fund or other institution employing that director, and that obviously makes for divided loyalties. Some of
these 824 “activist” directors serve only for a short period, as the firm is being sold or merged as a result
of the activists’ engagements. Nonetheless, Gow, Shin, and Srinivasan find some 678 activist directors
showing up on subsequent year SEC disclosure filings,58 meaning that they are in office for a continuing
period.
Even if we use this lower figure (678), that number represents nearly 97% of the 710 new
directors at these firms.59 The new route to the boardroom appears to be that of serving as the candidate
of an activist fund, and the role of the nominating committee is thus being eclipsed.
What does the presence of one or more “blockholder” directors, who made it to the board as a
result of pressure from activists, do to board cohesion? My own sense is that in the case of the larger
public corporation, the blockholder directors will resemble the other independent directors and will have
substantial business pedigrees involving high executive positions or other notable achievements. At
smaller firms, however, the blockholder directors will frequently be hedge fund employees, whose loyalty
will likely be to their employer. This may well change board dynamics and reduce the collegiality and
cohesion of the board. But, to the extent that the board wishes to act in a consensus-seeking manner, a
block of two or three such directors seems likely to have real impact and blocking position on many
issues.
At least for the immediate future, hedge fund activism seems more likely to grow than to subside.
The first half of 2016 saw 306 activist campaigns in the U.S., up from 278 in 2015.60 The most frequent
activist demand was for board representation, and companies generally negotiated a compromise, rather
than risk the humiliation of defeat in a proxy contest.
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C. The Shift in Executive Compensation: From Cash to Equity
Financial economists and corporate reformers often start with an assumption: Corporate managers
will pursue “empire-building” strategies that maximize firm size over profitability, because growth
maximization benefits managers personally. The conventional wisdom has long been that maximizing the
size of the firm benefits senior managers in at least three ways: (1) Large size usually correlates with
higher executive compensation, in part because compensation committees look to compensation levels at
the similarly-sized firms that constitute their corporation’s peer group; (2) If larger size is obtained
through acquiring firms in different industries, this reduces the risk of bankruptcy, as these firms may be
co-variant (that is, as the business cycle turns sour for one firm, it picks up for another); and (3) Larger
size protects the firm from a hostile takeover, as fewer bidders can afford to acquire it.
This premise that corporate managers favor size over profitability seemed accurate enough in the
former era when senior management was compensated largely in cash. But that world is as remote today
as “Gone With the Wind’s” Tara. To understand the dramatic change in executive compensation, it is
useful to start with research by Carola Frydman and Dirk Jenter, which shows that CEO compensation
took off, rising astronomically from the late 1980s on.61 Figure 2 below shows the sudden acceleration:

Figure 2: Median Compensation of CEOs and Other Top Officers from 1936 to 200562
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See Carola Frydman and Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, 2 Ann. Rev. Fin. Econ. 2:75-102 (2010).
Id at Figure 1.
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What caused this sudden rise after decades of stability? The simplest answer is the shift from cash
compensation to equity compensation. Frydman and Jenter again chart the change:

Panel A: The structure of CEO compensation from 1936 to 200563
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Id at at Figure 2.

21

As of 2015, Equilar reports that the share of total CEO compensation deriving from equity was 60% (with
cash accounting only for 36%) for companies in the S&P 500.64
If senior managers are compensated primarily in stock and have much of their wealth invested in
their company, they will rationally seek to maximize the firm’s stock price. Earlier, we considered the
cases of Valeant, Mylan and Wells Fargo, where unethical or even obviously fraudulent behavior seemed
linked to incentive compensation. Of course, most executives who receive incentive compensation do not
commit fraud. But the likelihood of fraud increases as the amount of incentive compensation at stake
grows larger.
Other impacts of this change in compensation are less obvious. Inefficient mergers or mergers in
which the acquirer overpays are no longer attractive to managers, because they reduce the stock price.
64

See Equilar, “2015 CEO Pay Strategies” at p. 9. The remaining 4% of compensation fell into the category of
“other.” Equally important at S&P 500 companies, the 36% cash component divided into 13% salary and 23% bonus
compensation. Id at 10. Bonuses are also a form of incentive compensation that increases the likelihood of risktaking. This study reports strong trend lines toward greater use of both performance-based stock compensation and
bonus compensation. From 2010 to 2014, the median value of performance-based stock compensation at firms in the
S&P 1500 index increased 38.1% and bonus compensation rose 12.4%; in sharp contrast, median salaries rose over
this same period only by 2.2%. Id at 8.
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More importantly, the CEO’s interests are now well aligned with those of the hedge fund activist; both
want to maximize the stock prize. Given this alignment, the board’s ability or willingness to pay its
traditional role as the corporate superego may be compromised.
IV.

A Short History of U.S. Corporate Governance

The corporate history of the public company in the United States during the 20th century can be
grouped into three stages. Of course, not all firms fit this pattern, and we are talking about the largest
firms, not start-ups.
A. Stage One: The Managerial Corporation (1920 to 1985)
Dispersed ownership arose first in the United States and later in the United Kingdom. Elsewhere,
it has appeared, but it is not the norm. In the U.S., the three most plausible explanations for dispersed
ownership are:
(1)

A merger wave from 1890 to 1910 combined large corporations into giant firms in

response to the Sherman Antitrust Act, which outlawed price-fixing and collusion, but not mergers that
created market power. Investment bankers and others saw the advantages (for shareholders) in forming
firms that dominated their industry and spared shareholders from “cutthroat competition” between rival
firms.65 The formation of U.S. Steel by J.P. Morgan is one of the clearest examples, as are numerous
railroad mergers.
(2)

Seeking to encourage retail ownership (and increased business for its brokers), the New

York Stock Exchange began a campaign around 1900 to assure investors that firms listed on it were safer
and sounder than firms traded elsewhere.66 To this end, it mandated financial disclosures (such as audited
financial statements) that no other exchange had required. Later in the 1920s, some large commercial
65

For an overview of this and other theories, see John C. Coffee, Jr. “Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, The
Evidence, And The Enduring Tension Between ‘Lumpers’ and ‘Splitters,’ in Dennis C. Mueller (ed.), THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAPITALISM (2012) at 463-507.
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On the role of the NYSE, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1 (2001).
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banks aggressively marketed stock to their individual clients, particularly focusing on middle class
individuals. Eventually, this produced a stock bubble at the end of the 1920s, but before then dispersed
ownership had arrived.
(3)

The size of the North American continent required immense amounts of capital to build

continent-spanning railroads and telegraph and telephone systems. Later, the infant auto industry had
similarly large capital needs. Although (as Mark Roe has argued67) it is conceivable that banks could
have financed these companies’ capital needs (as German banks did on a lesser scale), the U.S. banking
system was fragmented by the U.S.’s federal structure and possibly also by an aversion in the U.S. to
large financial institutions. As a result, U.S. banks remained relatively smaller and more fragmented than
their U.K or German equivalents, and it was necessary for growing firms to finance with equity.
Whichever theory is preferred (and all may apply), Adolf Berle and Gardinier Means discovered
in 1932 that dispersed ownership had arrived in the U.S.68 Historically, it developed in various industries
sometime between 1890 and 1920. Once share ownership became dispersed, relatively few firms had a
majority shareholder. Their absence effectively left management in control by default, and management
came to populate a majority of board seats.
How did management use their control? Many have argued that management displayed strong
risk aversion during this era. Their careers and fortunes were invested in their firms, and thus they
avoided leverage, maximized size (often through inefficient mergers), and, beginning in the 1950s,
pursued diversification through conglomerate acquisitions.69 Such an “empire-building” policy protected
managers, and acquisitions created new positions that senior and mid-level managers could assume at the
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new acquisitions. Later, when takeovers appeared, maximizing corporate size also promised relative
safety from hostile transactions.
During this era, compensation was mainly in cash. Compensation levels also remained fairly
low, possibly because of confiscatory tax rates in mid-Century America and possibly because of the
political embarrassment that might result from high CEO salaries during the Depression Era and World
War II eras.
Critics of “managerialism” argued that management in this era did not profit-maximize, but only
“profit-satisficed.”70 Partly, such a policy reduced risk, but even more, it balanced the interests of various
constituencies. Because dispersed shareholders held little power, management was equally responsive to
the interests of creditors, employees and local communities—all of whom were likely in closer personal
contact with management. Payout to shareholders remained a secondary concern, at least so long as some
“satisfactory” increase in revenues could be reported. Late in this era, as stock options came into use,
management became more attentive to their company’s stock price, but it was only a relative change. Not
until 1990 did a majority of the board at U.S. public corporations come to be composed of independent
outside directors.71 Until then, board oversight was probably more nominal than real.
The era of the managerial corporation came to an end in the 1980s, as the result of four
interrelated trends:
(1)

The rise of institutional investors, who rose from holding only 5% of the shares in the

early 1950s to a majority by the end of the 1980s;
(2)

The advent of the hostile takeover, which arose in the 1980s and came to focus on

dismantling conglomerate firms, largely to realize negative synergy;

70
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(3)

Accountability crises in the 1970s, involving foreign and domestic bribery and illegal

political contributions, which led to new legislation and demands for majority independent boards; and
(4)

The rise of global competition, which in particular challenged the American auto

industry, as foreign manufacturers began to produce lower cost vehicles.
The upshot of increased global competition was to end the cozy alliance between management
and other stakeholders, as management realized that it could no longer agree with unions on annual wage
increases and pass this cost onto consumers in annual price increases. Instead, it was forced to export
plants and jobs extraterritorially. Balancing shareholder and stakeholder interests became more difficult,
as profit margins fell and institutional investors began to assert themselves.
B. Stage Two: Passive Shareholder Capitalism (1985 to 2005)
By the mid-1980s, the dominant players in the corporate governance environment were pension
funds and mutual funds. Not only did they own the majority of the stock of public firms, but their desire
for high liquidity led them to concentrate their investments on the largest firms where they owned even
higher percentages (usually 70% or more). Thus, their influence was greatest at the Fortune 500 level.
One impact of their rise was a concomitant shift toward majority independent boards at public
companies. This was the type of generalized goal that diversified investors could support because it
applied universally and did not require ad hoc analysis. As the diagram below shows, sometime between
1985 and 1990, independent directors came to compose a majority of the board at public corporations:72
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Still, by law and by choice, both mutual and pension funds were diversified, and their large
portfolios implied little interest on their part in true firm-specific issues. To understand this, imagine that
the cost of a proxy fight might be several million dollars and that both mutual and pension funds rarely
held more than 2% of the stock of a portfolio firm. Even if that company pursued a highly inadvisable
policy, the multi-million dollar costs of such a proxy campaign were likely to exceed 2% of the projected
benefits of the campaign. Nor was there any established mechanism for sharing the costs of activism
among all shareholders (or even among all institutional holders). To be sure, it was virtually costless to
vote “no” on a management proposal or to vote in favor of a proposal brought by some other shareholder
(for example, a possible takeover bidder). As a result, activism was largely confined to resisting
management proposals and voting with those insurgent proposals that were brought.
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Some important developments did occur during this period. The rise of proxy advisors (most
notably, ISS) did reduce the costs of shareholder coordination. Also, institutions learned to use SEC Rule
14a-8 to make low-cost shareholder proposals,73 but these proposals were largely precatory, rather than
binding. Thus, institutions could coordinate at low cost to support a shareholder proposal, but these
usually related to a broader public policy issue (such as climate change or discrimination) or to broader
procedural governance issues (such as separating the CEO and board chair positions). Also, the Delaware
Supreme Court ruled at the end of this period that shareholders could not amend the bylaws so as to limit
the board’s power where the board was itself acting in pursuit of its fiduciary obligations.74 This
effectively seemed to mean that shareholders were largely confined to non-binding, precatory votes on
shareholder proposals.
The barrier to greater shareholder activism was not just the high cost of a proxy campaign, but
also the thin staffs at both mutual funds and pension funds. Mutual funds competed in terms of their
ability to minimize costs (which Morningstar publicly rated), and firm-specific activism required serious
and expensive staff work. Private pension funds had little interest in supporting shareholder activism
(because it might someday disrupt their own company), and public pension funds, while interested, were
chronically underfunded. As a result, shareholder activism that would propose firm-specific changes at
individual firms had to await a different champion.
C. Stage Three: Hedge Funds Emerge As The New Catalyst of Shareholder Activism
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The phenomena of “activist” hedge funds buying stock in target companies specifically to
propose changes in business policies and/or management first became clearly visible around 2005.75 With
this transition, shareholder activism moved from being essentially defensive (i.e., resisting management
proposals or compensation) to offensive (i.e., seeking specific actions, such as sales of the company,
restructurings, divestitures, major buybacks or, at the least, board representation for the activist). Over a
20-month period from 2005-2006, the first study of hedge fund activism counted some 52 activist
campaigns.76
The pace soon increased, and the period from 2010 to early 2014 witnessed 1,115 “activist”
campaigns.77 Despite substantial setbacks for some of the best-known activist funds in 2015, the first six
months of 2016 still saw a record level of activist campaigns.78
Behind this accelerating curve lie some basic institutional differences between mutual funds and
hedge funds: (1) Hedge funds are basically undiversified, and most hold relatively small portfolios in
terms of the number of stocks held; (2) Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds typically have significant staffs;
originally, they focused on finding undervalued stocks, but they are equally capable of identifying firms
where management changes might unlock negative synergy or provoke a sale to a new bidder; and (3)
Hedge funds employ compensation formulas that incentivize their managers to accept high risk.
These differences quickly surfaced in activist campaigns. Using their larger staffs, activist hedge
funds quickly developed a protocol under which they would prepare a lengthy “White Paper,” assessing
the target company and offering a recommended strategy. Often this paper would be several hundred
pages (and supplemented by PowerPoint slides). This both placed the burden on management to respond
and allowed the activist to convince diversified institutions that its plans at least justified giving it some
minority representation on the board. Because they were not required to contribute to the costs of the
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campaign, diversified investors were generally happy to free ride on the activist’s efforts. Also, to the
extent that the target had underperformed the market, diversified investors were sympathetic to some
change at the target. “What’s the harm?” was their standard question of management.79 But the presence
of even a handful of minority directors did change board dynamics.
The darker side of this new activism involves its reliance on tipping.80 Either by tipping favored
funds of their intentions or by allowing other funds to observe them and infer their intentions, some
activists learned to attract pre-announcement allies—some open and some hidden—, which enabled them
to assemble larger coalitions of shareholders. Once the “wolf pack” tactic was perfected, hedge funds
became far more potent insurgents than any other class of insurgent (other than the hostile bidder) had
ever been. Other activists do not tip allies in advance of public disclosure, but the practice seems
widespread.
The bottom line then is that the world looks bright for hedge fund activists; as they have many
advantages. Activists can economize on their costs, and they use a proxy fight only as their weapon of
last resort. Negotiations are conducted in the shadow of such a hostile option. Unlike the hostile bidder,
who could be halted (at least for a time) by the poison pill, the activist hedge fund can outflank that
defensive stratagem. By assembling a de facto coalition that could not be described as a “group” under
the SEC’s definition of that term, they escaped the reach of the poison pill, which usually limited how
much stock a “group” could acquire.
Further, the activist fund could profit in ways that the hostile bidder could not. It did not need to
seek control; rather it could seek only to put the target “in play” for another bidder to acquire. Acquiring
itself a far smaller stake than a hostile bidder, it needed less capital, and it could also bail out more
79
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quickly (and at a profit) if it saw little hope of the target being acquired. Finally, by seeking board
representation, it could seek to itself run (or at least influence) the auction for the target, turning the
acquisition from a hostile bid into a much safer “friendly” one.
In short, given these advantages, it should be little surprise then that activist campaigns continue
to increase.
V.

Activism and Social Responsibility

Much (but not all) of the academic literature on hedge fund activism applauds its rise, because
many academics see the underlying corporate governance issues as involving only the familiar tensions
between managers and shareholders.81 To be sure, their interests do conflict, and arguably activism has
reduced agency costs. But it is myopic to stop there. Other stakeholders have interests that are also
placed at risk by hedge fund activism. The clearest example is probably creditors. Much evidence shows
that creditors do foreseeably lose when activists begin to gain control, because hedge fund activism
typically results in greater leverage and thus an uncompensated increase in risk for existing creditors.82
Accordingly, creditors have incentives to adopt measures that protect themselves and even to pay
concessions to shareholders for such protections (as we will see shortly). In the case of employees, the
evidence is a little less clear, but some studies show that activism does result in reductions in the firm’s
total number of employees.83 More speculative is the impact of activism on other, more inchoate
constituencies, such as customers and local communities, but Valeant certainly provides one illustration
of a case where those interests were also injured. Ultimately, the real difference between these latter
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constituencies and creditors is that non-creditor stakeholders have less ability than creditors to contract
with the corporation and embed protections in their agreements.
Some will reply: “So what? It is management’s duty to pursue the interests of shareholders only
and maximize share value!” Actually, that overstates by a wide margin. Both Delaware cases and other
authoritative commentaries recognize that the board can make reasonable provisions for the interests of
other stakeholders.84 No case or statute has ever insisted the board is under a duty to maximize share
value (at least in the short run). Still, even if the board can consider the interests of other constituencies,
boards under the pressure of activist funds may be less able or willing to do so.
In this light, what principled positions exist that explain why the board should be able to protect
other stakeholders when their interests conflict with those of shareholders? Even more importantly, how
can such a principled position be reflected in realistic policies that can be effectively implemented? This
section will consider two possibilities.
A. Efficient Contracting: How the Board and Stakeholders Might Contract
Imagine that some creditors negotiate a contractual protection with the corporation that protects
them from what they see as opportunistic behavior by hedge fund activists and that the result is to
increase corporate cash flow without reducing the value of the firm. This outcome is exactly contrary to
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Even in the face of a lucrative takeover bid, the Delaware Supreme Court has ruled in its famous Unocal decision
that a target board may take defensive measures based on a concern for “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees and perhaps even the community generally).” Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 955 (1985). This is a clear recognition that the interests of stakeholders may be
considered, even when it may cost shareholders a significant gain.
The American Law Institute has generalized this position in Section 2.01 (“The objective and conduct of
the corporation”) of its PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994), which is its restatement-like
effort to codify the law of fiduciary duties. Initially, its states in Section 2.01(a) that “a corporation should have as
its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.” But
then it adds the important qualification in §2.01(b) that:
“(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the
corporation in the conduct of its businesses… may take into account ethical
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible
conduct of business;”
In short the board of Valeant could decide, consistent with its fiduciary duties to shareholders, that it was
irresponsible to spike the price of a life-saving drug by 500%.

32

what academics with a tunnel vision focused on manager/shareholder conflicts predict will happen. In
their view, any such contractual protection is simply a disguised takeover defense, which entrenches
management and therefore must reduce the value of the firm.
But the latest evidence seemingly contradicts the standard academic view. In two recent papers,
Professors Griffith and Reisel study a recent contractual innovation in corporate debt securities known as
“Dead Hand Proxy Puts” that has clearly been designed to deter hedge fund activism.85 Technically, the
Dead Hand Proxy Put updates a standard “change of control” provision in loan agreements and bond
indentures that provided for acceleration of corporate indebtedness upon certain defined “changes in
control” to include a new triggering event: the election of nominees of hedge fund activists to a majority
of the positions on the corporation’s board. Further, in order to cover the now typical scenario of
directors being added to the board as the result of a settlement with these activists, the provision expressly
provides that this acceleration provision cannot be waived by the board (and this makes the put a “dead
hand” provision in the parlance because it is beyond the power of the board to modify).
At first glance, this sounds like an anti-takeover defense. But now add a key fact: creditors
reduce the cost of credit to corporations that adopt Dead Hand Poison Puts. In their study, Griffith and
Reiser examine a sample of bank loans from 1994 through 2014 and find that the reduction in loan
spreads was statistically significant.86 The cost of debt was reduced by approximately 60 basis points,
and the authors estimate that the average annual saving in interest costs for the corporation was $22
million per year.87 Moreover, not only does the Dead Hand Poison Put reduce the cost of borrowing to
the corporation, but the adoption of such a provision did not result in any reduction in the firm’s stock
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price, thereby demonstrating that shareholders suffered no loss.88 Thus, this seems a win/win bargain for
both creditors and shareholders, as the former receive needed protections against a possible future danger
and shareholders get cheaper credit.
Griffith and Reisel view the use of this innovation as an example of efficient contracting.89
Creditors and managers have struck a good deal for both shareholders and creditors that mitigates the
possibility of future opportunistic behavior by activists. Nonetheless, the Delaware courts have been
skeptical and have suggested (but not yet held) that the adoption of such a provision may amount to a
breach of the board’s fiduciary duty.90 As a result, Dead Hand Proxy Puts are more used outside of
Delaware. Griffith and Reisel report that during 2015, 103 corporations incorporated outside of Delaware
adopted such provisions, while Delaware companies adopted 48 such provisions over the same period—a
more than 2:1 margin.91
Delaware’s skepticism may reflect the same myopic obsession with protecting shareholders from
management entrenchment that characterizes much of the academic literature on corporate governance.
Both miss the possibility that the board can play an umpire-like role, protecting stakeholders without
damaging shareholders by reducing firm value.
But only some stakeholders can contract efficiently with the corporation. In the case of creditors,
Griffith and Reisel find that although loan agreements contained Dead Hand Proxy Puts, bond indentures
seldom did—even though bondholders also benefitted when such a provision was inserted into the
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corporation’s loan agreements.92 They explain that bond indentures lack such a provision because there
was no feasible way for the bondholders to waive them (while the banks in loan syndicates could easily
waive them and often did so in return for an appropriate fee).93
This difference frames a key question: if the board can mitigate conflicts between stakeholders
and shareholders in a way that deters activists but does not reduce firm value, should the board be more
broadly authorized to do so, even when the compromise cannot be embedded in a formal contract? To
move beyond the simpler case of creditors, should the board also be able to make a commitment to its
employees that may benefit the corporation (by assuring labor tranquility or cheaper wages) and that does
not reduce firm value, but does deter activists. In principle, the answer should be yes, and the answer
should not turn on whether the deal can be set forth in a formal contract. But such an answer does require
enhanced judicial review to make certain that stakeholders have a legitimate interest and that both sides
actually benefit (or at least that the intent was to achieve such an outcome). A mere business judgment
standard of review would not be adequate to this task. Still, Delaware has long followed the Unocal
standard, which requires the board in adopting an antitakeover measure to show both a “threat” to
corporate interests and a response that was “reasonable” in relation to that threat.94 Under such a
standard, Dead Hand Proxy Puts should regularly survive judicial scrutiny.
To sum up, this section has argued that if some stakeholders can legitimately contract with the
corporation to protect themselves from the adverse consequences to them of an activist takeover, the
board should be able to act on behalf of those other stakeholders not in a position to contract. But the test
should look to whether the board is mediating a conflict between stakeholders and shareholders in a way
that can be expected to benefit the corporation.
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B. Looking for the Beneficial Owners’ Voice
Let’s return to the Valeant fact pattern and assume that a hypothetical drug company has
purchased an established drug for $10 million and can mark up its price by 500% so that it earns a $20
million return on its investment within two years.95 Assume further that no fraud or deception is
involved, and, on these facts, this clearly is not a case where efficient contracting could enable both sides
to realize reciprocal benefits. Here, our hypothetical firm expects to make a bonanza, but only if it spikes
the drug’s price.
To ethicists, such behavior is amoral at the least. But what is the appropriate answer to those,
who, like Milton Friedman, insist that the corporation is under a duty to maximize its profits for
shareholders?96 Technically, there may in fact be no such legal duty to maximize profits (at least over the
short run97), but that response does not answer how the board can justify not favoring its shareholders’
interests.
How can the board justify foregoing this profit? The best answer may be that the board believes
that its own shareholders on normative grounds would not want the firm to deal this harshly with its
customers. But how can we say this when institutional investors are buying the stock of our hypothetical
firm precisely because this strategy is so profitable? Here, we come to the key point: these intermediaries
(pension funds and mutual funds mainly) are themselves agents, and not the ultimate investor. Do these
intermediaries adequately represent the true interests of these funds’ beneficial owners? All that can be
fairly said is that we do not know. Our contemporary system of corporate governance relies on agents to
implement the investors’ right of franchise. Agents monitor agents: the board monitors management, and
institutional shareholders monitor the company’s board. But who monitors the agents at institutional
shareholders who make voting decisions on behalf of their beneficial owners? The short answer is that no
95
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independent outsider does this. In that light, one can question whether these agents’ decisions truly
reflect the views and values of the ultimate beneficial owners.
Even if this question cannot be answered with confidence, some evidence points to a likelihood
that the two groups (agents and ultimate owners) have very different attitudes. Although there is
relatively little research on values and social attitudes in corporate governance, one important study
surveyed all the directors and CEOs of public companies in one country (Sweden).98 It found strong
differences in the values and beliefs between directors committed to “shareholderism” and directors
favoring “stakeholderist” stances, but it further observed that even directors personally favoring
“stakeholders” found themselves under strong role pressure to vote instead in favor of shareholders.99
Other studies have similarly reported that directors often feel trapped by their traditional legal
responsibility to the shareholders.100 The fact that directors favor shareholders over stakeholders (even
with misgivings) will surprise few. At the pension fund level, however, it seems more anomalous that
those who vote on behalf of pension funds favor shareholders over stakeholders because the actual
beneficiaries of pension funds (i.e., employees) may be logically more stakeholder-oriented than
shareholder-oriented.
Should the pension fund’s trustees and agents, representing employees, behave differently than
other institutional shareholders and show greater loyalty to stakeholders? Legally, this is a complicated
issue. Traditionally, trustees are not required to follow instructions from beneficiaries (at least where the
beneficiaries are not unanimous), and trustees must act in the “best interests” of their beneficiaries.101
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Still, in determining the “best interests” of the beneficiaries, commentators agree that trustees may consult
with their beneficiaries, may consider prevailing social customs and values, and, based on them, may
decide to avoid “socially controversial activities posing financial risks to their portfolios.”102 This has
provided the justification for trustees to engage in “socially responsible investing” and to disdain
investing in certain industries. It is but a small step to move from trustees investing in a “socially
responsible” fashion to directors running the company in the same fashion, giving at least some weight to
the preferences of the beneficiaries. On this basis, the directors of a Valeant are certainly authorized to
deviate from the goal of shareholder wealth maximization in their conduct of the business when they
sense reputational or legal risk.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the agents throughout our corporate governance system favor
shareholders over stakeholders, particularly in the United States.103 Many tend to vote exactly as ISS or
other proxy advisors recommend,104 and ISS’s commitment is clearly to “shareholderism,” and not the
stakeholders. In fairness, ISS does not make the rules; rather, it responds to its constituents’ preferences.
Behind these preferences lies a professional culture, shared by both pension fund trustees and proxy
advisors, that demands loyalty to shareholders.
This article, therefore, submits that those controlling the voting behavior of large institutional
investors have preferences and values that probably are not well aligned with those of their beneficial
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holders (particularly in the case of pension funds). Put differently, it seems unreasonable to believe that
the ultimate beneficial holders lack any normative views and would impose no limitation on the pursuit of
profit maximization (even if that is how their agents vote). The behavior of a Valeant would shock most
(but probably not all) beneficial owners. Still, even if this premise is correct, where does it lead us in
policy terms? In theory, one could pass the voting rights at the pension fund through to the beneficial
owners, but as a practical matter, such a “pass through” is entirely infeasible and would be a radical
change. Not only would it be costly, but most beneficial owners will have even less interest in voting on
most issues than the retail shareholder (who is generally assumed to be rationally apathetic).
Possibly, less drastic measures may be feasible. Directors could attempt to learn the preferences
of beneficial owners and use it as a justification for resisting pressures from activists. For example, the
target corporation might attempt to reach the beneficial owners in an attempt to influence the actual
pension fund directors. To give an illustration, assume that the board and management of a large
corporation that is being challenged by activist funds attempts to reach (through the media) the beneficial
owners of CalPERS in order that their protests might deter CalPERS directors from voting for the funds’
nominees. Would that work? Or would it backfire? No one really knows today, but this is the one
leverage point that has not yet been exploited. Conceivably, pension funds could form advisory
committees of their beneficial owners to review and monitor their voting behavior. This would, however,
require recognition of this misalignment, which is still a tension more repressed than recognized.
At a minimum, however, corporate boards can justify acting as a corporate superego on the
ground that they believe their company’s ultimate investors want them to behave in this fashion. The
premise here is only that beneficial owners share the values of their society. Although this is a sound
normative argument, the problem is that it does not protect such directors from ouster by activist funds
that disagree.
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To sum up, the great anomaly in corporate governance today is that institutional investors (and
particularly pension funds) vote and behave as if they (1) had little or no interest in normative issues
about the behavior of their portfolio companies, and (2) were systematically pro-shareholder and antistakeholder. Yet, their beneficial owners likely have very different preferences. This tension is softened
and ameliorated to the extent that corporate boards can act as the firm’s superego, but the survival of that
role is in question.
C. Strengthening the Corporate Superego
Public corporations are required to have adequate internal controls, but this idea has not been
taken very far in terms of implementation. What more could be done? Consider the following measures:
1.

The corporation’s chief legal officer could be made to report directly to the board (or its

audit committee).105 The outside auditor already does so by virtue of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the
idea here would be to insulate the chief legal officer from managerial pressure (either to ignore evidence
of illegal or fraudulent conduct or to fail to report it to the audit committee). So insulated, the chief legal
officer could not be terminated by the CEO, but only by the board.
2.

All corporate officers and employees could be subjected by a corporate bylaw or policy

statement to an obligation that they report credible evidence of misconduct, illegality or fraud to the audit
committee. Today, Federal law only prohibits retaliation against whistle-blowers, but nothing typically
compels the employee to be an internal whistleblower and report misconduct upward within the
company.106
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3.

The corporation could even offer financial rewards to the employee who reports to the

audit committee. From a practical and hard-nosed perspective, the corporation might be willing to do so
because it prefers that a whistle-blower goes to it, rather than to the Government. Records would need to
be kept internally as to the information received and the responses made to it.
4.

Periodic legal audits could be required to review the company’s legal exposure. Such

audits would report to the audit committee not just whether the law had been violated, but where the
company had the greatest exposure to future legal problems. Again, this would be costly, but here the
Bar, eager for the business, would probably be supportive.
The net effect of these measures is hard to estimate and could be modest, but it would change the
functional activity of the audit committee, moving it from simply a monitor of financial performance to a
more investigative body. To be sure, it would be costly, but involvement in crime is ultimately even more
so.
D. Corporate Governance and Structure: Possible Reforms
A number of commentators have announced their diagnoses that hedge fund activism has
pressured public companies into an excessive focus on the short-run, and they have then proposed a
variety of reforms.107 A notable example is Colin Mayer, who would recognize a new specialized “trust
corporation” that would limit liquidity and effectively require long-term holding.108 Although this
approach might well work, it comes at a high price for institutional investors in terms of the necessary
sacrifice of liquidity. Probably, the closest “real world” equivalent to Colin Mayer’s “trust corporation”
is the new “public benefit corporation,” which expressly identifies the purposes other than shareholder
gain for which the corporation is founded and authorizes the board to balance between the interests of
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stakeholders and shareholders.109 Currently, over 4,000 such “public benefit” corporations exist in the
U.S., but none are publicly traded at this point.110 Thus, although some firms would opt into the model
that Colin Mayer has proposed, they will likely represent only a relatively small fraction of all U.S.
corporations.
In this light, it makes sense to ask: what are the less drastic means of encouraging longer term
holding by institutional investors, thereby discouraging brief in-and-out “raids” by activists who hold for
only a short period? Two means merit consideration: One is to amend the tax laws to raise the marginal
rate applicable to the short-term holding of securities.111 This involves a host of issues concerning tax law
that are beyond the scope of this brief article. A second route (and one that does not require legislation) is
to adopt some form of tenured voting under which short-term holders receive lesser voting rights per
share than longer-term holders.112 This is a more palatable alternative to dual class capital structures
(which give absolute control to the senior class), but it is probably also unlikely to win support today from
contemporary institutional investors. It would work, however, to the advantage of diversified institutional
investors (who often are indexed and tend to be longer-term holders). Activists could still win control,
but first they would have to convince the diversified (and longer-term) investors to vote for them: Also,
under tenured voting systems, the wolf-pack would no longer be an effective weapon for activists.
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The bottom line is that, although numerous governance changes could deter short-term activists,
few are likely to be adopted today. The search for remedies needs to look elsewhere.
E. Compensation Reforms
Earlier, it was argued that incentive compensation leads to increased risk-taking and reduced law
compliance.113 Much theory supports this, and Congress recognized it in principle in the Dodd-Frank Act
by restricting risky incentive compensation at “too big to fail” banks.114 But what can be done outside
that limited context? Congress is unlikely to regulate compensation, as corporate governance has
traditionally been seen as a matter for state regulation. Possibly more disclosure and comparative analysis
could be required. Credit rating agencies could also be compelled or induced to consider this factor in
rating the firm’s debt securities. Optimists may believe that other companies will also learn from
Valeant’s example and avoid creating compensation formulas that invite disaster. Nonetheless, one must
be skeptical here about the likelihood of significant reform.
VI.

Conclusion

We have moved, or are at least moving, from a board-centric system of corporate governance to a
shareholder-centric system. For our purposes, this recognition has two major implications: (1)
Corporations may be less law compliant and more risk-tolerant in this brave new world; and (2)
Stakeholders are increasingly exposed to loss from short-term activism.
This new reality that constituencies other than shareholders may desire (and need) judicial
protection poses a considerable challenge for courts, which have long focused almost exclusively on
shareholder protection.115 The traditional judicial rationale for this attitude of shareholder primacy was
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that only the dispersed and largely powerless shareholders truly depended on the board, while other
constituencies could protect themselves by contract or other protections. That rationale was always
overstated, but today it makes even less sense. Fearing real injury, stakeholders will today offer improved
terms if they can be protected from prospective opportunism. Dead Hand Proxy Puts provide an example
of such bilateral negotiations that improve the positions of both sides. Yet, many other stakeholders
cannot similarly so contract. Here, it still may be in the corporation’s long-term interests to protect such
exposed stakeholders from opportunistic behavior. Thus, when courts view new devices skeptically (such
as the proxy put116) because they believe their first obligation is to protect shareholders from managerial
entrenchment, these courts may be revealing an outdated understanding of contemporary corporate
governance.
In the last analysis, can ethicists and economists agree on much? Certainly, agreement should be
possible on two points: First, ethical failures are often the product of perverse incentives embodied in
compensation formulas that overly reward risk-taking. Second, from an ex ante perspective, it is wiser
for the board to engage in efficient long-term contracting with other stakeholders than to permit
shareholders to exploit ex post every opportunity on which stakeholder interests can be subordinated to
shareholder interests. But, even assuming agreement on these two points, neither takes us that far toward
a satisfactory resolution. Also, a third area where agreement should be possible has more pessimistic
implications: In the absence of structural or governance reforms that today seem unlikely, collisions
between the ethical course and the economically value-maximizing course are increasingly predictable.
If that is true and if we wish the board to play the role of corporate superego, how do we justify
the board assuming such a role and rejecting Milton Friedman’s edict that boards should maximize profits
for shareholders? Phrased differently, how does one answer the claim that it is anti-democratic and elitist
for the board to substitute its own moral values for those of its shareholders? The short answer is that no
one knows the actual preferences of the ultimate beneficiaries because our existing system of agents
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keeps them hidden. We live today in an age of “Intermediary Capitalism,” in which beneficial ownership
is divorced from any voice in the firm.117 In response, the board can and should be able to act on its
believe that it is representing the views of a “silent majority”—i.e., the company’s ultimate beneficial
holders at pension and mutual funds.
Once one postulates that there is such a silent majority (or, more simply, that short-term activists
do not truly represent all the shareholders), the more the board becomes entitled to define its role as a
counterbalancing force and to take a normative perspective. The real issue is not whether the board
should play such a superego role, but whether it can effectively do so in a world where the shareholders
can today more easily remove the board than in the past. The answer here is in doubt and may ultimately
depend on whether diversified investors come to recognize that their interests are not always well aligned
with those of activist investors. That will be a continuing story.
The bottom line is that ethics and the economic goal of shareholder wealth maximization will
remain in tension, with activist hedge funds exacerbating the friction. But, there are ways—limited to be
sure—of mediating this conflict if courts will view their role from a wider perspective that sees more than
shareholder interests at stake. For the long-run, however, governance reforms (such as tenured voting and
restrictions on incentive compensation) may be the better answer.
Realists will answer that most of the reforms discussed above are not feasible in at least the shortrun. Perhaps they are not, but, if so, the problem of the diminished corporate superego seems likely to get
worse, before it gets better.
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